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GROUND WATER MINING LAW AND POLICY* 
In 1975 irrigation accounted for eighty-three percent of the 
fresh water consumption in the United States,l and ninety-one per- 
cent of fresh water consumption in the W e ~ t . ~  Although the major 
source of irrigation water traditionally has been surface water, the 
use of ground water for irrigation has increased dramatically. 
Ground water constituted thirty-eight percent of the water used for 
irrigation in the West in 1975, compared with twenty-one percent in 
1955. During the same period, the quantity of ground water used for 
irrigation in the West increased from eighteen million acre feets 
(maf) to fifty-six maf. 
This increase in ground water use for irrigation has led to 
ground water mining in several western states, notably California, 
Texas, Nebraska, Arizona, and Kansas. Ground water mining or de- 
pletion occurs when withdrawals from an aquifer, a ground water 
formation, exceed net recharge. As ground water depletion occurs, 
the cost of pumping water from greater depths will increase. Wells 
will have to be deepened or replaced to continue yielding water. If 
ground water feeds streams, their baseflow will be reduced. Ground 
water pumping costs gradually will become so high that irrigators 
will be unable to afford full irrigation and will curtail withdrawals to 
reduce costs. Irrigation ultimately will be so expensive that it will be 
Published as Paper No. 6708, Journal Series, Nebraska Agricultural Experiment 
Station. Preparation of this article was supported by the Office of Water Research and 
Technology project 14-34-0001-8412, United States Department of the Interior, Washington, 
D.C. as authorized by the Water Resources Research and Development Act of 1978. 
1. The source for the water use statistics in this section are C. MURRAY & E. REEVES, 
ESTIMATED USE OF WATER I N  THE UNITED STATES IN 1975 24-25 (United States Geol. Survey 
Cir. NO. 765, 1977) and K. MACKICHAN, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER I N  THE UNITED STATES, 
1955 6-9 (U.S. Geol. Survey Cir. No. 398, 1957). 
2. As used in this article the "West" refers to the seventeen contiguous western states 
that follow the doctrine of prior appropriation to some extent in allocating rights to use surface 
or ground water, including: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, NG 
braska, Nevada, New Mexiw, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota. Texas, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming. 
3. An acre foot is 325,851 gallons, enough water to cover an acre of land one foot dcep. 
An acre foot of water would supply a family of five for one year and would irrigate a half acre 
of corn in most areas of Nebraska. 
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abandoned4 unless a supplemental source of water is obtained. When 
ground water irrigation is abandoned in this way economic depletion 
of the aquifer has occurred. 
As the National Water Commission observed, ground water 
mining "is not inherently wrongeHb Economic and associated social 
problems will occur, however, when ground water is mined without 
considering its future value. If ground water aquifers or reservoirs 
were not hydrologically interconnected with streams, were owned or 
controlled by a single entity, and did not generate regional economic 
activity, the decison to mine or not could be left to the owner.6 Pre- 
sumably the decision to mine or not would be based on balancing the 
economic benefits from present use with the anticipated economic 
benefits from future use.7 Ground water reservoirs, however, are 
often significantly hydrologically interrelated with streams, are 
rarely in a single ownership, and often generate regional economic 
a c t i ~ i t y . ~  Decisions about ground water mining do not affect only the 
overlying landowners, but also surface water users and regional 
economies benefiting from irrigated agricultural production. Irriga- 
tion historically has played an important role in stabilizing agricul- 
tural production and the associated regional economics during 
drought periods. The public impacts of ground water use create a 
tension between private incentives to mine ground water and public 
incentives to stabilize its use. 
Ground water is a common pool resource, one for which the 
right to use (typically without charge) is shared with others.@ Usu- 
ally there is no significant ceiling on the amount each user may 
take.1° Because the resource is not priced, there is no private incen- 
tive for any user to reduce current consumption to have more availa- 
ble for the future," Any user who does so runs the risk that another 
user will take the resource for present use.la There is no private in- 
centive to save for tomorrow, even if there is general agreement that 
4. This occurred in southern Texas when interstate price controls on natural gas were 
lifted. Irrigators, using what in effect was price controlled natural gas to power irrigation 
pumps, could not afford to continue irrigation when the price of natural gas increased 
dramatically. 
5 .  NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLIC~ES FOR THE FUTURE 239 (1973). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9 .  Id. 
10. Id. 
1 1 .  Id. 
1 2 .  Id. at 239-40. 
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the future value of the resource is greater than the present value.18 
Two major social consequences of unregulated development of com- 
mon pool resources are that (1) the resource is likely to be consumed 
at a rate faster than the optimum rate, and (2) local and regional 
economies dependent on the resource use will contract as depletion 
occurs.14 The first consequence is the basis for state laws regulating 
oil and gas production.16 The second consequence, referred to as the 
boom and bust syndrome, has been a traditional justification for fed- 
erally subsidized "rescue projects" designed to import a supplemen- 
tal water supply to an area mining ground water. 
An economic analysis of ground water mining in Oklahoma and 
Texas suggests that restrictions on ground water use will lead to 
greater economic benefits than would unregulated ground water min- 
ing.16 Such restrictions are not widespread in the West, however, 
principally because of political opposition from irrigators. Farmers 
traditionally have been given a high degree of independence in deter- 
mining how land and water resources are used in agricultural pro- 
duction. Governmental water use regulations are perceived as limit- 
ing this independence. Irrigators have incorrectly assumed that such 
regulations necessarily threaten their economic interests. This atti- 
tude is probably the single most important factor preventing effective 
regulation of ground water mining. 
States and the federal government have a common interest in 
preventing or controlling ground water mining. States are interested 
in managing ground water mining to achieve the greatest sustained 
economic benefit from ground water use. The adverse economic im- 
pacts of ground water depletion would be greatest at the state and 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Oil and gas are generally considered to be the private property of the overlying land- 
owner. This traditionally has meant that each landowner could withdraw as much of the min- 
eral as he was able to without regard to the effect on other overlying owners. Because this 
uncoordinated development would reduce the quantity of oil or gas that could ultimately be 
recovered, states have regulated oil and gas production, either by administrative regulation by 
a state oil and gas commission, by the authorization of compulsory unitization agreements, or 
both. Unitization refers to allocating each overlying landowner a proportionate share of the 
profits from oil or gas production regardless of where the producing wells are located. The 
necessity of state regulation to achieve the optimum withdrawal of oil and gas at  least suggests 
that such regulation may be necessary to achieve the optimum withdrawal of ground water. 
16. H. MAPP & V. EIDMAN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATING WATER-USE I N  
THE CENTRAL OGALALLA FORMATION 58-63 (Agric. Exp. Stat., Okla. St. U., Technical Bulle- 
tin T-141, 1976). The authors concluded that if the amount of groundwater available were 
limited, establishing a graduated tax on ground water use would lead to higher net farm in- 
come than would unrestricted pumping or restriction of withdrawals. 
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local levels. The federal interest in ground water mining is somewhat 
different. If economic depletion of a ground water supply is unplan- 
ned, irrigators are likely to request the federal government to furnish 
a federally subsidized supplemental water supply to sustain an estab- 
lished irrigation-dependent economy which developed on the improv- 
ident use of ground water.17 Federal rescue projects have taken the 
form of surface water irrigation projects where steamflow is dammed 
and transported to the area of need. Rescue projects relieve the 
mined area of the responsibility of living within the limits of its nat- 
ural water supply and also reduce the economic incentives to use 
ground water more efficiently by providing a cheaper, subsidized 
supplemental water supply. 
In most western states, ground water use is subject to some de- 
gree of state regulation. Effective regulations to deal with ground 
water mining, however, generally have not been established.l8 A po- 
litically more popular approach has been to develop a rescue project 
to import developed water supplies to augment diminishing ground 
water supplies. This has been accomplished in southern California 
with federal assistance through the Colorado River Project. Arizona 
and Texas are emulating the California experience in attempting to 
obtain a federal rescue project to cope with ground water mining 
through the Central Arizona Project and the High Plains Study, re- 
spectively. Federal provision of a rescue project in effect rewards an 
area for its improvident use of ground water, a policy that will 
hardly encourage states to develop policies to prevent or control 
ground water mining. 
This article will examine the physical, economic, and legal ef- 
fects of ground water mining. Traditional western water law doc- 
trines will be evaluated relative to ground water mining. Regulating 
ground water development and use in control areas will be discussed, 
17. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 5, a t  232. This concern is a legitimate 
one. In 1976 Congress authorized the High Plains Study to examine 
the depleton of the natural resources of those regions . . . presently utilizing the 
declining water resources of the Ogaliala aquifer [sic], and to develop plans to 
increase water supplies in the area and report thereon to Congress . . . . In formu- 
lating these plans, the Secretary [of Commerce] is directed . . . to examine the 
feasibility of various alternatives to provide adequale water supplies in the area 
. . . to assure the continued economic growth and vitality of the region. 
42 U.S.C. 8 1962(d)-18 (1980)(emphasis added). For a discussion of the present status of the 
High Plains Study see infra notes 71-78 and the accompanying text. 
18. G. SLOGGETT, MINING THE OGALLALA QUIFER: STATE AND LOCAL EFFORTS I N  
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT (Agric. Exp. Sta., United States Dep't of Ag. & Okla. St. U., 
Research Report P-761, 1977). 
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as will development of supplemental water supplies. The appropriate- 
ness of federal, state, and local rescue projects will be considered, 
particularly regarding under what conditions a taxpayer subsidy 
would be justified. 
I. PHYSICAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL EFFECTS OF GROUND 
WATER MINING'@ 
Both surface water (the water in lakes, rivers and streams) and 
ground water (the water stored in ground water reservoirs or aqui- 
fers) are ultimately derived from precipitation. Rainfall and melting 
snow feed streams and lakes as overland runoff. Some precipitation 
soaks into the ground, slowly moving laterally until it either drains 
into a lake or stream, or percolates downward where it,becomes a 
part of a ground water aquifer. The process of ground water storage 
in the West is slow because natural recharge is only a few acre in- 
chesaO of water per year. When the storage capacity of an aquifer is 
reached, ground water may be discharged into a stream or lake, may 
be tapped by the roots of subirrigated plants, or may be evaporated 
from lakes and wetlands.a1 
This equilibrium condition may be altered by ground water de- 
velopment and use. When ground water withdrawals exceed ground 
water recharge the balance comes from ground water stored in the 
aquifer. Sustained reductions in ground water storage reduce ground 
water discharge and constitute ground water mining. Common ef- 
fects of ground water mining include: declining ground water levels; 
increased pumping lifts and costs; and reduced aquifer discharge to 
streams or lakes, subirrigation, or wetlands. A new equilibrium con- 
dition may be established because of reduced discharge. In many 
19. For a description of the hydrologic cycle and its relation to ground water written for 
a general auidence see H. BALDWIN & C. MCGUINNESS, A PRIMER ON GROUND WATER, 
(United States Geol. Survey 1963); J. Crosby, A Loyman's Guide to Groundwa~er Hydrology 
in C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (National Water 
Commission Legal Study No. 6, 1971); L. LEOPOLD & W. LANGBEIN, A PRIMER ON WATER 
(United States Geol. Survey, 1960); Tripp & Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution. T e  
ward a Coordinated Strategy to Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 
3-4 (1979). 
20. An acre inch is 27,154 gallons of water, enough to cover an acre of land one inch 
deep. 
21. In some ground water aquifers little or no discharge occurs. In these closed aquifers 
water pressure increases as ground water storage occurs. When wells are drilled into these 
closed aquifers (called artesian aquifers), the artesian pressure forces the water to rise in the 
well. If enough ground water is withdrawn from an artesian aquifer, artesian pressure will 
ultimately be reduced to atmospheric pressure. See generally H. BALDWIN & C. MCGUIN- 
NESS, SUpM note 19, a t  8-10. 
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cases, however, an equilibrium may not be reached until withdrawals 
are reduced, either from the reduced capacity of an aquifer to yield 
water, or from reduced pumping. 
Many of the physical effects of ground water mining have prac- 
tical significance. Ground water pumping during the irrigation sea- 
son causes temporary, seasonal water level fluctuations that may 
lead to well interference conflicts. While ground water levels may 
partially or completely recover before the next irrigation season be- 
gins, well yields may be impaired during the irrigation season. This 
may require the drilling of deeper wells or the installation of more 
powerful pumps to maintain ground water supply availability. 
The resolution of well interference conflicts is a significant ele- 
ment of western ground water lawsaa An important component of a 
ground watkr right is (1) the extent to which a ground water user is 
protected in his original means of diverting ground water (i.e., his 
original well and pump) and (2)when shortages occur, how ground 
water will be allocated among competing users. When withdrawals 
by other ground water users are made, water levels in previously in- 
stalled wells may decline to the extent that the earlier user's well 
and pump stop yielding water. In most cases, the earlier user is able 
to restore his ground water supply by drilling a deeper well and in- 
stalling a more powerful pump. In other cases, ground water supplies 
may be temporarily or permanently inadequate to supply all users. 
When well capacity is inadequate to continue yielding water but well 
yields may be increased by installing new wells or pumps, the legal 
issue is whether the earlier user is entitled to compensaton for the 
cost of increasing well capacity and higher pumping costs. When the 
aquifer is inadequate to supply all users the legal issue is how ground 
water will be allocated among competing users. 
Western ground water law addresses the well interference con- 
flict issue, although in a variety of ways. The doctrine of prior appro- 
priation is the majority rule in the West,a8 although historically it 
22. See Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law and Administration, 59 NEB. L. REV. 917, 
922-30 (1980). 
23. CAL. WATER CODE $4 1200-1201 (West 197l)(however, appropriation is not the 
exclusive basis of California ground water law, see Aiken, supra note 22 at  926; COLO. REV. 
STAT. 3 37-90-137 (1973 & Supp. 1979) (apparently applying prior appropriation to non- 
tributary ground water outside of designated ground water basins, see 2 W. HUTCHINS, 
WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES (United States Dep't of Agric. Misc. Pub. 
No. 1206, 1974) 704; 3 W. HUTCHINS, id. at  236); IDAHO CODE $ 42-103 (1977); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. $ 82a-703 (1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 8 89-2916 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. 
8 534.020 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 75-1 1-1 (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE 3 61-01-01 (1960);. 
OR. REV. STAT. 8 537.525 (1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. 3 46-6-3 (Supp. 1979); UTAH 
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was preceded by the common-law overlying-rights doctrines of abso- 
lute ownership,a4 reasonable use,a6 and correlative rights. 
The absolute ownership doctrine reflects the early judicial as- 
sumption that ground water movement was unknowable and that 
courts therefore had no factual basis upon which to deal with well 
interference conflicts. Under the absolute ownership doctrine, the 
owner of land overlying a ground water aquifer may withdraw 
ground water without regard to the effect it may have on the wells of 
other overlying owners. Under the absolute ownership doctrine, ear- 
lier users have no legal protection regarding well interference con- 
flicts based on either well inadequacy or aquifer indequacy. 
The reasonable use doctrine addresses well interference conflicts 
but only to a limited extent. Under the reasonable use doctrine, a 
landowner's right to withdraw ground water will be restricted only if 
it is wasteful, used on nonoverlying land, or both. Otherwise, the 
landowner may withdraw ground water without regard to the effect 
on the wells of other overlying owners. 
The correlative rights doctrine addresses well interference con- 
flicts in theory by prorating the available supply among ground 
water users when shortages occur. In practice, however, the correla- 
tive rights doctrine in California is part of the legal basis for inte- 
grating the use of ground water and imported surface water supplies, 
not a policy for restricting ground water use if well interference con- 
flicts occur.2B Under the correlative rights doctrine, the earlier 
ground water user has no legal protection regarding well interference 
conflicts based on well inadequacy, but theoretically may obtain ju- 
dicial relief if well interference is based on aquifer inadequacy. 
CODE ANN. 8 73-3-1 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 8 90.44.040 (1962); WYO. STAT. $ 41- 
144 (Supp. 1975). 
24. See Vineland Irr. Dist. v.  Azusa Irr. Co., 126 Cal. 486, 58 P.1057 (1899); Public 
Util. Comm'n v. Natatorium Co., 36 Idaho 287, 21 1 P.533 (1922); Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 
588 (1 88 1); Mosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363 (1872); Vanderwork v. Hewes, 15 N.M. 439, 1 10 
P.567 (1910); Metcalf v. Nelson, 8 S.D.  87, 65 N.W. 91 1 (1895); Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. 
v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904); Herriman Irr. Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P.719 
(1902); Hunt v. Laramie, 26 Wyo. 160, 181 P.137 (1919); TERR. OKLA. STAT. 8 4162 (1890). 
25. See Maricopa County Mun. Water Consew. Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest Cotton Co., 
39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (1931); Katz v. Waikinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 P.663 (1902), afd on 
rehearing, 141 Cal. 137, 74 P.766 (1903); Ryan v. Quinlan, 45 Mont. 521, 124 P.512 (1912); 
Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933); Volkman v. Crosby, 120 
N.W.2d 18 (N.D.  1963); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1937); Bull 
v. Siegrist, 169 Or. 180, 126 P.2d 832 (1942); Horne v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 59 Utah 279, 
202 P.815 (1921); Evans v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 47 P.2d 984 (1935); Binning v. 
Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102 P.2d 54 (1940). 
26. See infra notes 60-62 and the accompanying text. 
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Appropriation states vary in their approaches to well interfer- 
ence conflicts, although earlier users, "senior appropriators," gener- 
ally are entitled to some protection. In theory, conflicts between 
ground water appropriators are resolved by requiring a junior appro- 
priator to stop withdrawals when they interfere with those of a senior 
appropriatdr. In most states the senior appropriator must enforce his 
priority through litigation, although some states authorize adminis- 
trative enforcement of ground water prioritiesea7 Administrative re- 
striction of new appropriations, through well spacing requirements or 
withdrawal limitations, may protect senior ground water appropria- 
tors when the proposed ground water appropriation might interfere 
with existing rights.ae A common approach is to protect reasonable 
pumping depths, which does not protect the senior appropriator's ini- 
tial well and pump, but does limit the extent to which ground water 
levels will be allowed to decline.pB This protects senior appropriators 
regarding future ground water level declines but not regarding past 
ground water level declines.80 
Seasonal well interference conflicts are not necessarily an indi- 
cation of ground water mining because adequate supplies are often 
available by drilling deeper wells or by installing more powerful 
pumps. If water levels decline annually as well as seasonally, how- 
ever, ground water mining is occurring. As water levels decline 
pumping costs will increase. This will gradually raise the irrigator's 
costs to the point that he will reduce his ground water withdrawals, 
improve his irrigation efficiency, grow crops using less water, or re- 
duce his irrigated acreage. These changes in irrigation practices will 
occur gradually because depletion of ground water supplies generally 
27. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 8 89-2932 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. 534.110(6) 
(1973); OR. REV. STAT. 8 537. 775 (1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 46-6.2 (Supp. 1979); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 90.44.130, .I80 (1967); WYO. STAT. 8 41-132 (Supp. 1975)(in 
control areas only). 
28. COLO. REV. STAT. 37-90-137 (Supp. 1979)(applies only to appropriation of non- 
tributary ground water outside of designated ground water basins); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. 8 
89-2918 (Supp. 1977) (in control areas only); Nev. REV. STAT. $ 534.110(7)(1973)(in desig- 
nated basins only); N.M. STAT. ANN. 8 73-1 1-3 (Supp. 1975)(Senior appropriators must toler- 
ate some ground water level reduction, Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 
(1967)); OR. REV, STAT. $8 537.620(3), .620(4), .622 (1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 46-6- 
7 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $5  99.44.030, .090 (1962); WYO. STAT. 5 41-140 (Supp. 
1975)(in control areas only). 
29. IDAHO CODE 8 42-226 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. $8 534.1 10(3), .110(4)(1973); S.D. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 46-6-6.1 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90-44.070 (1962); 
WYO. STAT. 8 41-141 (Supp. 1975). 
30. Conflicts between surface and ground water users typically are resolved on the same 
basis as well interference conflicts. See Aiken, supra note 22, at 936-40. 
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occurs over decades. Similarly, the reduction in economic activity as- 
sociated with the transition back to dryland agriculture will occur 
over a period of decades. Local and state economies will not experi- 
ence a sharp decline, but will slowly change as irrigation is gradually 
reduced. 
The major policy issue related to ground water mining is 
whether the inevitable consequences of mining should be postponed 
by regulation. If supplemental water supplies are not developed, re- 
duced irrigation is the inevitable consequence of ground water min- 
ing. If irrigators will be forced by higher pumping costs to use im- 
proved irrigation methods, should regulations be established to 
accomplish that same result sooner? The advantage of doing so is 
that ground water supplies last longer than they would otherwise. 
The disadvantage is that irrigators incur higher costs sooner than 
they would if ground water use were governed only by the private 
costs and benefits of irrigation. The public cost of administering 
ground water regulations is an additional factor. The ultimate issue 
is whether current economic benefits should be forgone to sustain 
future economic benefits. 
The ground water mining issue is not directly addressed by 
traditional western ground water law  doctrine^.^' The absolute own- 
ership and reasonable use doctrines permit ground water withdraw- 
als to occur without regard to whether mining is occurring. Under 
the absolute ownership doctrine ground water withdrawals may be 
enjoined only if they are m a l i c i o ~ s . ~ ~  Under the reasonable use doc- 
trine a landowner's right to withdraw ground water may be enjoined 
only if it is wasteful, used on nonoverlying land, or both. The correl- 
ative rights doctrine addresses ground water mining in theory by 
prorating the "safe yield" of an aquifer among ground water users. 
In practice, however, the correlative rights doctrine in California is 
part of the legal basis for integrating the use of ground water and 
imported surface water supplies, not a policy for restricting ground 
L 31. See id. at 930-35. 
32. Contrast this with the administrative regulation of oil and gas production for the 
benefit of all overlying owners discussed supra note 15. The common law doctrine of absolute 
ownership is essentially the law of capture, giving each landowner all the oil, gas, or water he 
is capable of pumping before it is withdrawn by another overlying owner. The legislative impo- 
sition of the unitization theory (requiring proportional sharing of the profits of oil or gas pro- 
duction among all overlying owners) protects all overlying landowners from the disproportion- 
ate withdrawals by any single overlying owner. The common law version, however, provides no 
such protection. 
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water use if mining occurs.8s 
Appropriation states vary in their approaches to ground water 
mining. In theory, conflicts between ground water appropriators are 
resolved by requiring the junior appropriator to stop withdrawah 
when they interfere with those of senior appropriators. Similarly, re- 
stricting new appropriations when they may interfere with existing 
ground water appropriators may protect existing ground water users. 
Neither approach, however, will necessarily prevent ground water 
mining. 
Because of the inadequacy of traditional ground water law doc- 
trines (which are basically modifications of surface water law doc- 
trines) to deal with ground water,s4 several western states have en- 
acted "critical area" legislation authorizing special ground water 
regulations in designated critical areas.s6 The general objectives ,of 
such legislation are to slow or stop ground water mining, to resolve 
administratively well interference conflicts, and to protect existing 
irrigation-based econ~rn ie s .~~  
Designating critical ground water areas is typically a state re- 
spon~ibil i ty,~~ although designation procedures may be initiated by 
33. See infra notes 60-62 and the accompanying text. 
34. For a discussion of the physical differences between surface and ground water occur- 
rence and their implicatons for water allocation policies, see Aiken, supra note 22. a t  920-21. 
35. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 45-401 to -415; COLO. REV. STAT. 37-90-102 (1974); 
IDAHO CODE 5 42-233a (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1036 (Supp. 1979); MONT. 
REV. CODES ANN. 8 89-2914 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. $ 46-656 (Reissue 1978); NEV. 
REV. STAT. 5 534.020 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. $ 75-11-13 (3968); OR. REV. STAT. 5 
537.735 (1979); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, 5 52-021 (Vernon Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 90.44.130 (1962); WYO. STAT. 5 41-129 (Supp. 1975). New Mexico also autho- 
rizes regulation of ground water i n  artesian basins and formation of artesian conservancy dis- 
tricts. N.M. STAT. ANN. $5 75-12-2 to -13-1 (1968). States without some critical area legisla- 
tion are California, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Utah. Oklahoma legislation 
authorizing special ground water regulation in designated areas was hbsequently repealed. 
See 3 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 23, a t  437-39; Rarick, Oklahoma Water Lrrw, Ground or 
Percolating in the Pre-1971 Period, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 403 (1971). 
36. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 9 45-401(A) (Supp 1981); IDAHO CODE 5 42-233a (Supp. 
1979); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, $ 52.117 (Vernon Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE 0 
ANN. 5 90.44.130 (1962). 
37. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., $8 45.412 to -414; COLO. REV. STAT. 5 37-90- 
106(1)(1974); IDAHO CODE 5 42-233a (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 82a-1038 (Supp. 
1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 5 89-2914 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. 46- 
658(a)(Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 534.030(2)(1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 75-11- 
13 (1968); OR. REV. STAT. 5 537-730 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 90.44.130 (1968); 
WYO. STAT. $ 42-129(b)(Supp. 1975). 
Texas takes the unique approach of establishing ground water controls through the forma- 
19821 GROUND WATER MINING 5 15 
either state officialss8 or upon the petition of local ground water 
users.8B Criteria for designating critical areas vary considerably and 
include: (1) withdrawals approaching or exceeding an aquifer's "safe 
yield" or recharge,'O (2) ground water level declines," (3) conflicts 
between ground water users,4a (4) water quality degradation,'= and 
(5) land subsidence." The ground water controls authorized in criti- 
cal areas also vary considerably and include: (1) requiring state per- 
mits for new wells;46 (2) restricting ground water development 
through permit denials,'' well spacing requirements," or well drill- 
ing morat~r ia ; '~  and (3) reducing ground water withdrawals by en- 
tion of underground water conservation districts. TEX. WATER CODE ANN, tit. 2, § 52.021 
(Vernon Supp. 1979). State officials do not have a significant role in ground water policy 
development and implementation. 
38. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 46.412 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. 37-90-106(1) 
(1974); IDAHO CODE 8 42-233a (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. 82a-1036 (Supp. 1979); 
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-2914 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. $ 534.030(2) (1973); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 75-11-13 (1968); OR. REV. STAT. $ 537.730 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. 5 90.44.130 (1968); WYO. STAT. 5 41-129(b) (Supp. 1975). Texas and Nebraska are the 
only states in which ground water controls cannot be initiated by state officials. 
39. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 45-4 15 (Supp 198 1); KAN. STAT. ANN. 82a- 1036 (Supp. 
1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 8 89-2914 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46- 
658(3)(Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.030(1) (1973); OR.  REV. STAT. $ 537-730 
(1979); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, $ 52.021 (Vernon Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. 5 90.44.130 (1968); WYO. STAT. 41-132 (Supp. 1975). 
40. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 45-412(1) (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a- 
1036(b)(Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. !j 89-2914(1)(Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. 3 
537.730(3)(1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 90.44.130 (1968); WYO. STAT. § 41- 
129(a)(i)(Supp. 1975). 
41. KAN. STAT. ANN.  82a-1036(a)(Supp. 1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.730(1)(1979); 
WYO. STAT. 49-129(a)(ii)(Supp. 1975). 
42. NEB. REV. STAT. 46-658(l)(a)(Cum, Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 8 
89-2914(3)(Supp. 1977); OR.  REV. STAT. 3 537-720(2) (1979); WYO. STAT. 41- 
129(a)(iii)(Supp. 1975). 
43. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 45-412(3) (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. 82a- 
1036(d)(Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. 537-730 (1979). 
44. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 3 45-412(2) (SUPP. 1981). 
45. Coto. REV. STAT. !j 37-90-107 (1974 & Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. 46- 
659(1)(Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 534.050 (1975); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 
2, 52.1 14 (Vernon 1972). 
46. COLO. REV..STAT. 8 37-90-107 (1974 & Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE 42-233a 
(Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. 533.370(4), 534.1 10(3) (1973). 
47. NEB, REV. STAT. 8 46+666(l)(c)(Cum. Supp. 1980); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, 
52.117 (Vernon Supp. 1979); WYO. STAT. 41-132(a)(v)(Supp. 1975). 
48. KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 82a-1038(b)(l)(Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. 46- 
666(4)(Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 534.110(7) (1973); OR. REV. STAT. 8 
537.730(1)(1979); WYO. STAT. 5 41-132(a)(i)(Supp. 1975). Arizona does not establish a well 
drilling moratorium per se, but additional land cannot be irrigated in "irrigation non-expan- 
sion areas," in "active management areas," and during the consideraton of whether an active 
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forcing priorities,'@ reducing presently authorized withdrawalsPO ro- 
tating  withdrawal^,^^ enforcing voluntary pumping agreementsPa and 
purchasing and retiring ground water pumping rights.68 
The difficulty of obtaining reliable informaton about ground 
water availability significantly affects the development of ground 
water policies including determining whether the critical area re- 
strictions described above should be implemented. Information about 
surface water availability can be obtained by observing and measur- 
ing streamflow which greatly simplifies the task of surface water ad- 
ministration. Information about ground water availability, however, 
is not so easily obtained. The typical sources are geologic data from 
test hole drilling for oil and gas, and well logs from oil, gas, and 
water well installation. From these data, geologists can construct the 
geologic profile of an area which will include the location and gen- 
eral character of ground water aquifers. 
These data typically are not available for analysis, nor are they 
geologically analyzed, until significant water well installation has oc- 
curred. This has important implications for the development of criti- 
cal area ground water controls. Water rights in the West are typi- 
cally administered on a complaint basis; state water officials will not 
administratively regulate water users unless a complaint if filed, 
often informally, by a senior appropriator. Ground water develop- 
ment will occur freely, subject, of course, to ground water availabil- 
ity, unless senior appropriators complain. If no complaints are made, 
ground water management concerns will not develop until irrigators 
begin to notice that water levels in their wells are falling. This may 
not occur for many years after ground water development has 
started. Water level declines are likely to lead to the formal monitor- 
ing of water levels on a regional basis to determine whether ground 
management area should be designated. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $5 45-432, -452, -416 (Supp. 
1981). 
49. KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 82a-1038(b)(2)(Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 5 89- 
2915(1)(Supp. 1977); NEV.  REV. STAT. 8 534.110(6)(1978); OR. REV. STAT. $ 
537.730(a)(1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 8 90.44.130 (1962); WYO. STAT. 41-132(a)(ii), 
-l32(a)(iii)(Supp. 1975). 
50. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $8 45-541 to -545, -563 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 
82a-I038(b)(3)(Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-666(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980); OR. REV. 
STAT. $ 537.730(4)(1979). 
51. KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 82a-1036(b)(4)(Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46- 
666(l)(b)(Cum. Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. 5 537-730(5)(1979); WYO. STAT. § 41- 
132(a)(iv)(Supp. 1975). 
52. OR. REV. STAT. 5 537.735 (l979); WYO. STAT. 5 41-132(c) (Supp. 1975). 
53. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 45-566(A)(6), -567(A)(6) (Supp. 1981). 
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water mining is occurring or whether ground water level declines are 
a local phenomenon only. The significant point, however, is that seri- 
ous ground water data collection may begin only after ground water 
users have noticed that ground water level declines have begun. 
Once geologic investigations (which may range in detail and sophis- 
tication from ground water level decline maps to computer projec- 
tions of aquifer conditions for the next fifty years) have established 
the existence of ground water mining, irrigators may initiate volun- 
tary water conservation efforts to improve irrigation efficiency, and 
state officials may establish control area regulations." In the absence 
of such information, however, irrigation water management or con- 
trol area regulations are unlikely to be developed. 
The importance of ground water data as a prerequisite to effec- 
tive ground water regulaton and management efforts cannot be over- 
stated, In the parallel surface water situation, user conflicts can eas- 
ily be documented by gauging whether sufficient water is flowing 
past a senior appropriator's point of diversion. If not, the withdraw- 
als of upstream junior appropriators are restricted until the senior 
appropriator's needs have been satisfied. Streamflow can be depleted 
temporarily by appropriators, but this will last only until the next 
rain or until stored water is released from surface water reservoirs. 
The ground water situation is much different. There is typically little 
information regarding how much ground water is available, although 
annual ground water level declines can be documented through 
ground water level monitoring programs. This lag between the oc- 
currence of ground water mining and the development of the neces- 
sary information for informed ground water regulation and manage- 
ment efforts ensures that mining problems will worsen before 
management efforts are instituted. This delay will make those man- 
agement efforts more difficult to implement because less ground 
water and correspondingly fewer management options will be 
available. 
Ground water controls are not usually embraced by irrigators. 
Development restrictions are favored by existing irrigators because 
their pumping rights will be protected from potential competitors. 
Development restrictions will be opposed by potential ground water 
54. Control area regulations may also be initiated when ground water users complain 
about well interference conflicts. Before ground water regulations are imposed, however, state 
water officials typically will require some documentation that well interference conflicts are 
actually occurring (e.g., to establish that the failure of a well is related to water level changes 
caused by well pumping rather than being caused by mechanical failure of the pump, clogging 
of the well casing, etc.) before administrative action will be taken. 
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users who correctly argue that they are being regulated for the bene- 
fit of those who caused the mining problem in the first place. Use 
restrictions are also unpopular with irrigators who perceive them as 
threats to their economic livelihood, but this view ignores two facts. 
First, considerable room for improvement in irrigation efficiency is 
usually possible without substantial increases in irrigation costs.66 
Second, if withdrawals are not reduced through regulation, they ulti- 
mately will be reduced because of reduced aquifer capacity. The is- 
sue is whether regulation to extend aquifer life is preferable to 
forced reductions in withdrawals because of increased pumping 
costs, reduced aquifer capacity, or both. 
Ground water regulations are not a popular way to deal with 
ground water mining, at least among ground water users. The degree 
of political and economic sacrifice necessary to implement ground 
water controls ensures that they will not be embraced by irrigators. 
The more popular and politically palatable approach for dealing with 
ground water mining is to augment existing water supplies. This al- 
ternative is particularly appealing if the cost of developing additional 
supplies will be federally subsidized. 
States have traditionally encouraged irrigation development, 
first by developing water laws protecting irrigation water usesse and 
later by authorizing the organization of irrigation and reclamation 
distri~ts. '~ Reclamation districts typically are organized to facilitate 
development of federal reclamation projects. Reclamation districts 
also usually have the authority to levy property taxes against land 
within the district and to issue bonds. This financial authority would 
enable reclamation districts to develop surface water storage projects 
in.the absence of federal subsidies if the projects were economically 
feasible or if state or local taxpayers could be persuaded to subsidize 
the costs of project development. 
Supply augmentation related to ground water mining has been 
implemented on a large scale in southern California where imported 
Colorado River water has been made available for municipal and 
agricultural purposes through the federal Colorado River Project. 
Arizona and Texas are now attempting to obtain federal rescue 
55. See Aiken, The National Water Policy Review and Western Water Rights L a w  Re- 
form. 59 NEB. L. REV. 327,.329-33 (1980). 
56. See generally Trelease, Law, Water and People: The Role of Water h w  in Conserv- 
ing and Developing Natural Resources in the West, 18 WYO. L.J. 3 (1963). 
5 7 .  See generally 4 R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS $8  340-46 (1970). 
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projects to cope with ground water mining. Because California is the 
prototype for western states in dealing with ground water mining 
through developing imported surface water supplies, the California 
experience will be briefly recounted.68 
Because local ground water supplies have been inadequate to 
meet growing municipal and agricultural water needs, Los Angeles 
has imported surface water to augment native supplies for over sev- 
enty years. The first source of supplemental water was the Owens 
Valley. Surface water was imported to Los Angeles from the Sierra 
Nevada mountains through the 250 mile Los Angeles Aqueduct, 
completed in 1913. Although Los Angeles financed construction of 
most of the aqueduct and storage facilities, Owens Valley water was 
initially used for irrigation in the San Fernando Valley. Los Angeles 
was subsequently required to purchase irrigated land to obtain the 
Owens Valley water it had originally developed. 
The second major source of supplemental water for Los Angeles 
is the Colorado River. As early as 1901, Colorado River water was 
imported to the Imperial Valley through the Imperial Canal for irri- 
gation. Irrigation interests subsequently persuaded the federal Bu- 
reau of Reclamation to study the importation of Colorado River 
water to southern California. In 1921, the Bureau recommended 
construction of Hoover Dam in Boulder Canyon fo; flood control, 
water supply, and hydropower generation. The Bureau also recom- 
mended construction of a canal to deliver Colorado River Water to 
Imperial Valley irrigators. In 1922, Secretary of State Herbert Hoo- 
ver met with the seven Colorado River basin states to negotiate an 
interstate compact apportioning Colorado River water between Up- 
per Basin states (Colorado, Utah and Wyoming) and Lower Basin 
states (Arizona, California, Nevada and New Mexico). Arizona re- 
fused to sign the initial compact proposal, correctly concluding that 
California water development would prevent Arizona from acquiring 
as much Colorado River water as it would prefer. A six state Colo- 
rado River Compact, excluding Arizona, was executed in 1925, allo- 
cating 7.5 million acre feet (maf) per year each to the Upper and 
58. For a discussion of water development efforts in southern California, see E. COOPER, 
AQUEDUCT EMPIRE (1968). Regarding the controversial Colorado River Project, see R . H .  
BOYLE, J .  GROVES & T. WATKINS, THE WATER HUSTLERS 134-201 (1971); B. HOLMES. HIS- 
TORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS AND POLICIES. 1961-70 53-60 (United 
States Dep't of Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 1379, 1979); Trelease, Arizona v. CafiJornia: AIlocation 
of Water Resources to the People, States and Nation, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 158; Meyers, The 
Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966); Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian - A 
Solution to FederalState Conflicts over Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 33 ( I  968). 
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Lower Basin states. Up to one maf of any annual surplus above 
fifteen maf could be appropriated by Lower Basin states. The Com- 
pact did not apportion water among the Lower Basin states. For this 
reason, Arizona did not ratify the compact until 1944 when it pur- 
sued construction of the Central Arizona Project. 
The Compact was ratified by Congress in the Boulder Canyon 
Project Act of 1928.68 The Act required California to limit its an- 
nual consumption to 4.4 maf plus half of any surplus available to the 
Lower Basin states. The Act was passed in part because Los Angeles 
successfully integrated irrigation and municipal water interests to 
support the Act. Los Angeles, in 1923, proposed that a second dam, 
Imperial Dam, and canal, the All-American Canal, be constructed to 
deliver Colorado River water to irrigators. Los Angeles also organ- 
ized the Metropolitan Water District, representing municipal water 
districts from thirteen southern California cities, to support the Act 
and the Colorado River Project. The combined irrigation and urban 
interests were successful in obtaining passage of the Boulder Canyon 
Project Act which authorized the federal construction of Hoover 
Dam, Imperial Dam, and the All-American Canal. Parker Dam was 
subsequently authorized to complete the Colorado River Project, In 
1931, voters within the Metropolitan Water District authorized con- 
struction of the Colorado River Aqueduct to deliver Colorado River 
water to the Los Angeles region. Construction of Hoover Dam began 
in 1931 and was cgmpleted in 1935. Parker Dam and Imperial Dam 
were completed in 1938. The Colorado River Aqueduct and the All- 
American Canal were completed in 1939 and 1940, respectively. To- 
tal project costs exceeded $400 million. 
The availability of supplemental water has led to the integrated 
use of imported surface water and native ground water in southern 
C a l i f ~ r n i a . ~ ~  This includes the use of underground storage capacity 
created by ground water mining to store imported surface water un- 
derground. California Supreme Court decisions have facilitated the 
evolution of these integrated use policies by recognizing an exclusive 
right of ground water recharge entities to control withdrawals of 
water stored u n d e r g r o ~ n d . ~ ~  If rights to withdraw ground water are 
59. 45 Stat. 1057 (1928), amended by 43 U.S.C. 5 617 (Supp. I V  1980). 
60. See Aiken, supra note 22, at 934-35. 
61. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943); City of 
Los Angeles v .  City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.2d 199, 537 P.2d 1250 (1975). Regarding Glen- 
dale see Kreiger & Banks, Groundwater Basin Management, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1962). 
Regarding San Fernando, see Gleason, Water Projects Go Underground, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 625 
(1976). 
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judicially determined and withdrawals limited to each user's propor- 
tionate share of the aquifer's "safe yield," recharge entities can 
charge water users for any ground water withdrawn in excess of the 
safe yield allocation. The safe yield adjudication process essentially 
establishes that any ground water withdrawn in excess of the safe 
yield allocation is recharged ground water for which the recharge 
entity is entitled to be paid.62 
The development of effective institutions for integrating the use 
of supplemental surface water with native ground water supplies is 
an important water management technique. The attractiveness of 
this innovation should not obscure, however, that southern California 
ground water users have thus far managed to avoid water supply 
restrictions resulting from regulation of ground water development 
and use largely because of federally subsidized interstate surface 
water transfers. 
Arizona is experiencing water supply problems similar to Cali- 
fornia's. Irrigation and agriculture are competing for diminishing 
ground water supplies. Because of irrigation and municipal demands, 
ground water in Arizona is being mined at a rate of over two million 
acre feet (maf) per year.B3 The proposed Bureau of Reclamation 
Central Arizona Project (CAP) would divert approximately 1.2 maf 
of Colorado River water to the Tuscon and Phoenix areas to provide 
water for irrigation and municipal purposes. Although Arizona origi- 
nally opposed the federal Colorado River Project, it ratified the Col- 
orado River Compact in 1944 to pursue development of the CAP. 
Congressional authorization of the CAP was delayed, however, be- 
cause of legal uncertainty regarding whether Arizona had title to 
sufficient water under the Compact for the project. To clarify its 
Compact water entitlements, Arizona sued California in 1952. In the 
1963 decision, Arizona v. Calif~rnia,~' the U.S.  Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of Arizona, which means that Los Angeles will lose 
approximately one maf if and when the CAP is constructed. While 
part of the CAP has been constructed, additional congressional fund- 
ing authorizations are needed to complete the project. 
The potentially most grandiose federal rescue project, proposing 
to import Missouri River water principally to the Texas panhandle, 
is the subject of the ongoing High Plains Study. Texas is second only 
62. Regarding ground water recharge policies of other western states, see Aiken, supra 
note 22, at 935. 
63. B. HOLMES, supra note 58, at 57. 
64. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
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to California in the amount of ground water withdrawn and the 
number of acres irrigated. Ten maf of ground water were withdrawn 
in Texas in 1975, compared to eighteen maf in Calif~rnia.'~ Irriga- 
tion from the Ogallala aquifer in the Texas high plains, the panhan- 
dle region, began in the 1 9 3 0 ' ~ . ~ ~  High plains water levels began to 
fall in the 1940's. State legislation authorized the formation of 
ground water conservation  district^,^^ some of which have (1) re- 
stricted ground water development through well-spacing require- 
ments and (2) indirectly restricted withdrawals through irrigation 
runoff control requirements.'j8 The first state water development 
planee concluded in 1966 (1) that intrastate water importation to 
western Texas would be insufficient to continue high plains irrigation 
and (2) that federally subsidized water importation from the Missis- 
sippi, Missouri, or Columbia rivers would allow high plains irrigation 
to stabilize or expand. These conclusions were included in the 1968 
Texas Water Plan.7o Texas has opted to pursue implementation of 
its water plan rather than impose ground water restrictions. 
In 1976 Texas cooperated with other southern high plains 
states, particularly Oklahoma, in persuading Congress to authorize 
the High Plains Study (HPS) to study water importation to the high 
plains regiona71 The authorization foj the study, however, reflects 
that some political compromises were necessary to obtain congres- 
sional approval. The justifications for the study are "to assure an 
adequate supply of food to the Nation" and "to promote the em- 
nomic vitality of the High Plains R e g i ~ n . " ~ ~  Study objectives are "to 
study the depletion of the natural resources of [the states using] de- 
clining [sic] water resources of the Ogallala aquifer" and "to de- 
velop plans to increase water supplies in the area and report thereon 
to Congress, together with any recommendations for further congres- 
sional action."73 The study must "examine the feasibility of various 
alternatives to provide adequate water supply [sic] in the area in- 
65. C. MURRAY & E. REEVES, supra note 1 ,  at 24-25. 
66. Regarding irrigation and water development activities in Texas see R.  BOYLE. J.  
GROVES & T. WATKINS, supra note 58, at 18-129. 
67. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. art. 2, 8 52.021 (Vernon 1972). 
68. See G .  SLOGGETT, supra note 18,  at 1 1 .  
69. State water planning has been used principally to identify where federal reclamation 
and flood control projects should be constructed. See Aiken, supra note 55, at 343-44. 
70. R. BOYLE, J.  GROVES, & T. WATKINS, supra note 58, at 50-62. 
71. Pub. L. No. 94-587, $ 193, 90 Stat. 2943 (1976), codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 1962618 
(1976), partially reprinted supra, note 17. 
72. Id. (emphasis added). 
73.  Id. 
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cluding, but not limited to, the transfer of water from adjacent areas 
. . . to assure the continued economic growth and vitality of the re- 
gion."I4 The study must include an evaluation of the costs and bene- 
fits of various actions and the costs of inaction. In evaluating water 
transfer options, existing water rights and future water needs of all 
affected areas must be considered. 
The apparent congressional intent suggests that (1) the eco- 
nomic vitality of the region as a whole is the primary concern rather 
than the economic vitality of individual states within the region; (2) 
depletion of oil and gas reserves in the region is a valid ?factor for 
consideration; (3) sources of supplemental water could include the 
Missouri River but not the Columbia River; (4) future water needs 
of the exporting and importing basins should be considered equally 
(i.e., no protection for basin of origin); and (5) environmental con- 
cerns, not mentioned in the study authorization, probably are 
subordinate to economic development concerns. 
The Economic Development Administration (EDA) of the 
United States Department of Commerce is responsible to Congress 
for implementing the study. Because the six high plains states (Colo- 
rado, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas) are 
responsible for conducting the study and have a stake in the out- 
come, administration of the study is governed by the High Plains 
Study C ~ u n c i l . ~ ~  Council membership includes the governors of the 
high plains states, three other representatives from each state (usu- 
ally water rights officials, water planning officials, and state legisla- 
tors), and EDA representatives. Each state has equal Council repre- 
sentation, making study domination by any single state difficult. 
The HPS will examine six alternative development strategies: 
(1) baseline (no change), (2) voluntary and mandatory water use 
restrictions, (3)  local water supply augmentation, (4) intrastate 
water transfers, (5) interstate water transfers, and ( 6 )  nonagricul- 
tural development options. The baseline and interstate transfers are 
the only alternatives for which published informaton is available. 
The baseline scenario represents what would happen from 1977 
to 2020 if the status quo were maintained: i.e., no new ground water 
regulations, supplemental water supply projects, or technological in- 
74. Id. (emphasis added). 
75. The source of information about HPS study administration and the baseline results 
is High Plains Study Council, Six-State High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer Resources Study: Con- 
gressional Briefing /Paper] (February 25, 1981). The congressional briefing paper is the only 
official HPS report issued to date. 
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novations. The baseline scenario assumes, however, that irrigation 
water use efficiency will improve considerably during the study pe- 
riod. Increasing irrigation costs are projected to give irrigators suffi- 
cient private economic incentives to adopt improved irrigation prac- 
tices and technologies currently available. Irrigated crop prices are 
projected to increase in real terms, discounted for inflation, but not 
as rapidly as during the past decade. Increases in United States pop- 
ulation and, more importantly, increases in agricultural exports are 
the primary reasons crop prices are expected to increase. The base- 
line scenario also evaluates regional oil and gas production. 
The baseline results indicate that annual regional ground water 
withdrawals are projected to decline from twenty-two rnaf in 1977 to 
twenty rnaf in 2020. The number of acres irrigated is projected to 
increase, however, from twelve million to 13.5 million. The annual 
economic value of irrigated production is projected to increase from 
$4.5 billion to eleven billion, primarily because of increased crop 
prices. Annual natural gas production is projected to decrease from 
5.5 billion cubic feet to 0.5 billion cubic feet. Annual oil production 
is also projected to decrease from 500 million barrels to fifty million 
barrels. The annual economic value of oil and gas production is pro- 
jected to increase from0$3.5 billion in 1977 to a peak of five billion in 
2000 but is projected to decline to $1.5 billion in 2020. 
The regional irrigation aggregates, projecting a net increase in 
the value of irrigated production, mask a substantial regional shift in 
the location of irrigation. Annual ground water withdrawals for irri- 
gation are projected to decrease by nine percent by 2020. Most of 
the decrease will occur in Texas and Kansas, with an increase occur- 
ring in Nebraska. Annual ground water withdrawals in Texas are 
projected to decrease from eight rnaf to 4.8 maf, a forty percent re- 
duction. Annual ground water withdrawals in Kansas are projected 
to decrease from three rnaf to 0.3 maf, a ninety percent reduction. 
Annual ground water withdrawals in Nebraska are projected,-to in- 
crease from eight rnaf to thirteen maf, a sixty percent increa~e. '~ 
The corresponding losses of irrigated acres in Texas and Kansas will 
be more than balanced by the increase in irrigation in Nebraska. 
Texas and Kansas are also likely to lose livestock feeding operations 
to Nebraska. Approximately six million acres will revert to dryland 
production, while additional acres will be only partially irrigated. 
The baseline results suggest that regional economic vitality will 
76. Annual ground water withdrawals in Colorado, New Mexico and Oklahoma are pro- 
jected to average approximately one rnaf throughout the study period. 
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improve during the next forty years. The annual regional value of 
oil, gas, and irrigated production will increase from eight billion to 
$12.5 billion. If Nebraska were excluded from the region, however, 
the remaining high plains states would suffer a decline in the value 
of annual oil, gas, and irrigated production. 
Interstate water transfers were evaluated by the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps identified four possible water 
importation alternatives, primarily from the Missouri and Arkansas 
rivers.77 The annual cost of imported surface water averages $600 
per acre foot, several times what an irrigator could afford to pay. 
Implementation of any importation option would require a substan- 
tial subsidy. 
The HPS resolution indicated two justifications for the study: 
maintaining an adequate food supply to the nation and maintaining 
the economic vitality of the high plains region. The baseline results 
indicate that regional crop production will increase, although exports 
and food prices will be higher. This suggests that United States food 
supplies will certainly be adequate, if somewhat more expensive. Re- 
gional economic vitality will also improve, although most of the in- 
crease in irrigated production will occur in Nebraska. If Nebraska 
were excluded, the rest of the region would decline economically, 
based on reductions in irrigation, oil, and gas production. Water im- 
portation to maintain irrigation in Texas and Kansas would require 
federal subsidies of up to $91 billion for construction, plus annual 
federal operation and maintenance subsidies of up to $13 billion. 
Federal subsidies of this magnitude cannot be justified on the basis 
of protecting either the nation's food supplies or the economic vital- 
ity of the high plains region. Whether subsidies of this magnitude 
are politically feasible during what may be a period of federal budg- 
77. The Corps evaluated two alternatives for each route, a lower-cost, lower-volume op- 
tion with a higher cost per acre foot of water delivered, and a higher-cost, higher-volume 
option with a lower cost per acre foot of water delivered. The first option would import 2.1 maf 
and 6.4 maf of Missouri River water from South Dakota to southwest Nebraska, northeast 
Colorado, and western Kansas at  an annual average cost of $410 and $340, respectively. The 
second option would import one and six maf of Missouri River water from Missouri to western 
Kansas at  an annual average cost of $880 and $352 per acre foot, respectively. The third 
option would import two maf and 6.8 maf of water principally from the Arkansas River in 
Arkansas to the northern Texas high plains at an annual average cost of $752 and $482 per 
acre foot respectively. The fourth option would import 2.4 maf and 7.2 maf of water from the 
Arkansas, Ouachita, Red, Sabine, and Sulfur rivers in Arkansas and Texas to the Texas high 
plains at  an average annual cost of $785 and $695 per acre foot, respectively. These costs do 
not include the cost of delivering imported water to irrigators. These water distribution costs 
are probably the only costs the irrigators are likely to undertake themselves, acting collectively 
through an irrigation or reclamation district. 
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etary austerity remains to be seen, but it seems ~nlikely. '~ If a fed- 
eral high plains rescue project is not launched, establishing ground 
water controls or improvements in irrigation efficiency may yet ex- 
tend the life of ground water supplies in the high plains region. If 
not, Texas and Kansas will suffer the consequences of not imposing 
ground water controls to extend the life of ground water supplies. 
IV. POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
Although ground water mining is slowly documented, it is a for- 
seeable and inevitable consequence of extensive ground water devel- 
opment for irrigation and other high-volume uses. The basic ques- 
tions for policy makers are whether to act or do nothing. General 
policy options include restricting ground water development or use, 
and supply augmentation. 
Ground water restrictions are unpopular but essentially only re- 
quire legally what reduced aquifer capacity would ultimately require 
physically: reduced ground water use.70 Irrigation restrictions may 
be evaulated in different phases: (1) irrigation runoff controls, (2) 
irrigation scheduling, and (3)  water quantity  restriction^.^^ Reducing 
irrigation runoff is not difficult or expensive to accomplish and typi- 
cally can be effected by capturing runoff in irrigation reuse pits for 
subsequent reuse. Runoff controls reduce ground water withdrawals 
for irrigation but also affect irrigation return flows. If the runoff 
would have percolated back into the aquifer, runoff controls may 
have little effect on net ground water withdrawals, although irriga- 
tors pumping costs will be reduced. If the runoff would have re- 
turned to a stream, runoff controls will reduce the water that would 
otherwise have been available to downstream water users. Irrigation 
scheduling, the next step in reducing irrigation water use, requires 
field monitoring of crop water needs and application of irrigation 
water only when natural precipitation is insufficient. Irrigation 
scheduling may be more expensive to implement than runoff controls 
and requires better water management by the irrigator. Net ground 
water withdrawals may be reduced somewhat to the extent crop 
78. In addition, use of water from the upper Missouri River would be subject t'o existing 
use for navigation, Indian water rights, and potential use for energy development. Proposals to 
implement any of the transfer options would lead to interstate political conflicts over which 
state is allocated what quantity of water in addition to any funding controversies. 
79.' For a general discussion of ground water development and use restrictions see Aiken 
& Supalla, Ground Water Mining and Western Water Rights Law: The Nebraska Experience, 
24 S.D.L. REV. 607, 629-40 (1979). 
80. For a general discussion of legal aspects of improving water use efficiency see Aiken, 
supra note 55, at 329-33. 
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water use and evaporation are reduced. Significant reductions in 
ground water withdrawals and a corresponding increase in aquifer 
life will not occur, however, until ground water withdrawals are re- 
stricted to the extent that irrigators are required either to change 
cropping patterns to include crops requiring less water or to reduce 
irrigated acreage. At this point, the value of irrigated production 
may be adversely affected, but the life of ground water supplies is 
more likely to be significantly increased. 
The important issue relative to ground water controls is whether 
the cost of administering regulations and any economic benefits post- 
poned due to ground water controls are outweighed by the future 
economic benefits achieved by extending aquifer life. Irrigation ru- 
noff controls and irrigation scheduling will reduce gross ground 
water withdrawals but may not have a significant effect on net 
ground water withdrawals. Ground water withdrawal restrictions, 
leading to growing crops requiring less water or a reduction of irri- 
gated acreage, may reduce current economic benefits from irrigation, 
but those benefits will be sustained for a longer period. 
Supply augmentation may be subsidized or unsubsidized. Fed- 
eral subsidies are undesirable for two reasons: (1) there appears to 
be no national benefit from subsidizing irrigation in the West, and 
(2) federal rescue efforts reduce state and local incentives to control 
ground water use. Federal reclamation policy originally developed as 
a ineans to encourage settlement of the western frontier.81 Federal 
irrigation water was provided to give homesteaders the means to set- 
tle and "reclaim" the arid West. The reclamation program received 
its greatest impetus during the Depression, when it was perceived, as 
were other public works programs, as a means of creating needed 
jobs. While the settlement and employment aspects of the federal 
reclamation program were sufficient justifications in earlier cicum- 
stances, both fail as adequate justifications for continued federal sub- 
sidy of rescue projects today. 
In addition to their cost, a further disadvantage of federal res- 
cue projects is that they in effect reward areas that fail to control 
ground water mining. Continued provision of subsidized irrigation 
water will not encourage irrigators or states to control ground water 
use but will encourage ground water mining. 
While federal subsidies through rescue projects are undesirable, 
81. For a general discussion of the historical evolution of federal reclamation policy see 
B. HOLMES, A History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 1800-1960 (United States 
Dep't of Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 1233, 1972). 
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state or local subsidies may be more appropriate. After the irriga- 
tors, local and state economies benefit most from irrigation develop- 
ment. The existence of this economic benefit may enable irrigators to 
persuade local residents or state legislators to authorize reclamation 
bonds to construct supplemental water supply projects if ground 
water mining occurs. If irrigators fail to persuade others that the 
economic benefits from irrigation are worth protecting through state 
or local subsidy, perhaps those benefits are not as great as originally 
,perceived. In any event, the difficulty of obtaining a state or local 
subsidy to provide a supplemental water supply may make irrigators 
more willing to consider ground water controls as means of dealing 
with ground water mining. 
